DIPLOMA WORK On the topic: The Problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula With a degree in International Relations
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DIPLOMA WORK
On the topic: The Problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula
With a degree in International Relations
ABSTRACT
The volume of the thesis: 40 p.
The Number of sources used: 25
Key words: The problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, USA, South Korea, Russia, IAEA, DPRK, RK, NPT
The subject of the study of research work is the problem of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula
The purpose of the work: based on scientific analysis to identify opportunities and the prospects of denuclearization of North Korea
The source base there were works of domestic and foreign scientists on the study of the East-Asian region. A huge flow of scientific literature in a number of Russian, and English sources.
Theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis. The paper uses empirical and analytical methods to describe the key parameters of the problem under study, as well as a systematic approach. Elements of content analysis of political events reflected in various sources of information are used: monographs, mass media, scientific and educational Internet resources.
Scientific novelty of the research. External factors have had a significant impact on North Korea. The identification of North Korea's development prospects is a scientific novelty that will give impetus to the development of renewed relations between North Korea and world powers in various fields.
The practical significance of the research it consists in studying the theoretical and methodological foundations of denuclearization problems, identifying new centers of political and economic development, and identifying the factors that caused the so-called problems in denuclearization.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
1.1 The essence of the nuclear issue of the DPRK in the military-strategic plan
It is generally recognized that the greatest threat to global peace and security is posed by weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons. Although the likelihood of a large-scale military conflict involving nuclear weapons has decreased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the danger comes from the very existence of such weapons. In this regard, special attention is drawn to the so-called threshold States that have prerequisites for creating their own nuclear weapons. If this happens, the balance of power will be disrupted at the regional, and possibly global, level.
However, the DPRK's nuclear program is also a danger to the international community. This is due to the violation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the possibility of exporting nuclear technologies to other countries. There are different opinions about when North Korea began developing its nuclear program. Some experts believe that this happened almost immediately after the end of the Korean war, during which the US authorities seriously considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the DPRK. Others attribute the beginning of the DPRK's nuclear program to the first half of the 1960s. The fact that North Korea has the potential to develop its own nuclear program became obvious in 1947, when deposits of uranium were discovered in the North of the country. However, the path from uranium to nuclear weapons is long and difficult, and it is impossible to do without high technologies. The Democratic people's Republic of Korea, which was created only in 1948 and was devastated by the bloody civil war of 1951-1953, could not make this journey on its own. In 1956, the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on cooperation in the nuclear field, but there was no talk of nuclear weapons. It was simply dangerous to let the unpredictable "great leader" Kim Il Sung join the elite "nuclear club" — the Korean war that ended shortly before, unleashed by the North, almost resulted in world war III. The agreement provided for the development of North Korean nuclear power.
Until the mid-1980s, events developed in this way. In 1965, an experimental reactor was launched in the town of Yanbian with the technical assistance of the USSR. The research center for nuclear physics was also established there. In order to maintain secrecy, the entire complex was named "Yanbian furniture factory". Highly enriched uranium was used as fuel in the reactor. Fuel cells for the North Korean reactor were supplied from the Soviet Union, but over time, North Korea has established production of uranium from its own deposits. North Korea pledged to export spent fuel from the reactor back to the Soviet Union, which allowed Moscow to control the development of this project. Under pressure from Moscow in 1977, it was put under the supervision of the International atomic energy Agency.
A sharp acceleration of the North Korean nuclear program occurred in the 1980s, and this was due to a number of reasons. First, the gradual rapprochement between Moscow, Beijing, and Seoul, which began in the mid-1980s, and the General development trends of the socialist camp countries led to the growing isolation of North Korea. The gradual destruction of the bipolar structure of international relations, the tendency to bring former ideological rivals closer together, and, as a result, the narrowing of the field for diplomatic maneuvers, became one of the factors that accelerated the development of the North Korean nuclear missile program. The economic difficulties that the DPRK is experiencing on an increasing scale have also played a role: with the growing gap between the economies of the North and the South, the build-up of conventional weapons has become increasingly problematic.
To speed up the nuclear program, the DPRK authorities have stepped up cooperation with the USSR. In may of 1984, Kim Il sung made a trip to Moscow. At a meeting with the Soviet leader K. Chernenko, he asked for assistance in building a nuclear power plant in North Korea to solve the problem of electricity shortage in the DPRK. The Soviet side agreed to implement the project, but the condition for its implementation was the accession of the DPRK to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In December 1985 North Korea joined into Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the same time then North Korea signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on scientific and technical cooperation. According to this agreement, the Soviet Union undertook to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea. In December 1988, the deadline for North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA expired. Pyongyang signed the Treaty in December 1985, but an error was made while filling out the necessary documents. Whether it was accidental or deliberate is unknown. But as a result of this bureaucratic error, the final deadline for signing verification agreements with the IAEA was delayed until December 1988.
However, even after this period, the DPRK did not sign the agreement. Such actions by Pyongyang have raised suspicions in the US and in the West. Based on intelligence, it was concluded that the size of the gas-graphite reactor is too large for scientific research, but not enough for energy needs. In 1989 he appeared that built in Yanbian plant for reprocessing of nuclear fuel, as well as the site for testing. According to South Korean analytical data, since the mid-1990s, Pyongyang has been able to start producing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, at the official level, Pyongyang advocated turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. June 23, 1986 North Korea issued a special statement that was approved by its two main allies, the Soviet Union and China. In this statement, the government of the DPRK committed itself to refrain from testing, producing, storing and arming nuclear weapons, promised not to allow the establishment of any foreign military bases, including nuclear bases, and not to allow the transport of foreign nuclear weapons through its territory, airspace and territorial waters. A year later, on July 13, 1987, the DPRK authorities confirmed their position on the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula. It seems that these actions were primarily aimed at the gradual removal of American nuclear weapons from the territory of the Korean Peninsula. The initiatives put forward by Pyongyang, the US government proposed, first, to take practical steps to stop the deployment of new nuclear weapons and their delivery means in South Korea, to withdraw all existing nuclear weapons in the ROK and cancel all operational plans relating to the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. In November 1989 The DPRK foreign Ministry issued a new statement in which he offered to hold talks involving the DPRK, the United States and South Korea on the withdrawal of us nuclear weapons from the southern part of the Peninsula, and also to carry out negotiations between North and South for the adoption of a Declaration on the transformation of the Peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone. However, negotiations on signing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA continued. According to the Declaration of the United States from 1978, "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States that signed the NPT except in cases of an attack on U.S. territory or armed forces, or its allies by such a state which is allied with nuclear powers, or acting in conjunction with nuclear power in the implementation or support of such attacks". Due to the fact that the ROK was an ally of the United States, and the DPRK was an ally of the USSR and China nuclear powers this Declaration did not serve as an obstacle to the use of nuclear weapons by the United States against North Korea. That is why, in order to ensure its own security, the DPRK demanded the following amendments: first, the nuclear-weapon States should not "threaten a non-nuclear state, a member of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons"; second, it was necessary to completely remove nuclear weapons from the territory of the Korean Peninsula. In a statement addressed to the IAEA, the DPRK warned that it could resort to the tenth article of the NPT and withdraw from the Treaty if its demands for amendments were not met. However, due to changes in the General system of international relations, in the context of Moscow and Seoul's rapprochement and the simultaneous weakening of Moscow's ties with Pyongyang, the DPRK's positions in the negotiations were not strong enough, and the proposals were not implemented.
1.2 Negotiations in the 90s-00s
The structural changes in the system of international relations that took place in 1991-1992 had a significant impact on the development of the situation around the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the prospects for a nuclear-free status of the Peninsula. The possibility of normalizing relations between the DPRK and Japan and, as a result, receiving significant economic assistance and reparations, directly depended on Pyongyang signing the safeguards agreement and allowing IAEA inspectors into the country.
The position of the USSR and China on the issue of nuclear control largely coincided with the position of the United States, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1991, the opening of joint foreign trade offices in Seoul and Beijing, which, in fact, meant the establishment of diplomatic relations and could contribute to a General defusing of tension in the region. The first Gulf war led the United States to stop considering nuclear weapons as the main deterrent, which in turn contributed to a change in the United States ' position regarding its nuclear weapons in South Korea. In may 1991, US representatives made it clear for the first time that Washington was going to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, in June 1991, the representative of the state Department, R. Boucher, made a special statement that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea or any other state party to the NPT.
These structural changes, as well as the new us position, have had a significant impact on North Korea's policy on this issue. If in the middle of 1991 North Korea insisted that the safeguards agreement could only be signed after the complete withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the South of the Peninsula.in November 1991, representatives of the DPRK were ready to sign the agreement at the beginning of the withdrawal process. The withdrawal began three days after this statement, and on December 11, 1991. South Korean Prime Minister Chun Wonsik said that all American weapons have been withdrawn from South Korea and offered to open American bases for inspections in exchange for inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Moreover, South Korea has made it clear that in case of concessions by Pyongyang on the nuclear issue will be reviewed by the South Korean position on the joint us-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit.
The change in the total structure of relations in the region and, as a consequence, the possibility of mutual concessions resulted in the negotiation of the space between the sides, with the result that at the end of 1991 was signed, and in early 1992 came into effect two important documents: the Agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, exchange and cooperation between the ROK and the DPRK; Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In the Declaration on nuclear-weapon-free status, the parties pledged not to test, produce, acquire, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. It was also stated that nuclear energy will only be used for peaceful purposes. A separate paragraph concerned the refusal to own nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. To guarantee the agreement, the parties agreed to conduct mutual inspections. The signing of these agreements contributed to the further development of cooperation between the United States, Kazakhstan and North Korea on the nuclear issue. In January 1992, negotiations between representatives of the United States and the DPRK were held at an unprecedented high level in new York.as a result, on January 30, 1992, the Deputy Minister of atomic energy of North Korea, Hong Kunbo, signed a safeguards agreement with the Director General of the IAEA, H. Blix. Already in April 1992, the agreement was ratified by the Supreme people's Assembly of the DPRK, and since June, the IAEA has begun inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Although many American analysts believed that the IAEA inspections would hardly be able to stop the development of the North Korean nuclear program, since it is unlikely that the Agency will get access to all nuclear facilities on the territory of the DPRK. In 1992, IAEA representatives conducted six inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, and in late 1992, the Agency also conducted laboratory tests of plutonium and spent nuclear fuel. Analysis of the plutonium sample showed that it had been accumulating for several years and was obtained from reactor fuel, which gave reason to suspect North Korea of hiding some plutonium. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent fuel storage facilities, which were not declared, but were refused on the grounds that these facilities are not related to the nuclear program and are of a military nature. The Agency said that in this case, the issue could be referred to the UN Security Council, but North Korea continued to evade inspections, explaining its position by resuming the us-South Korean Team Spirit program and introducing a paramilitary situation in the DPRK in this regard. On March 12, 1993, based on the tenth article of the NPT, according to which "each party to this Treaty, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have jeopardized the Supreme interests of its country", the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the Treaty. This date is considered the official beginning of the first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT provoked a sharply negative reaction from the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the entire world community.
In April 1993, the IAEA Board of governors declared that North Korea had violated the NPT and expressed its intention to request the UN Security Council to apply sanctions against Pyongyang. The United States discussed two possible solutions to this problem: sanctions or missile strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities. Perry, the defense Secretary, noted that preemptive missile strikes would lead to the beginning of the second Korean war, and recommended that the President use the policy of imposing sanctions. In March-April 1993, the North Korean foreign Ministry offered to hold talks between the two countries based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit to resolve the nuclear issue. These statements indicate that the first nuclear crisis was caused primarily by the increasing isolation of the DPRK, both in the region and in the world as a whole. Pyongyang's initiatives, as well as the inability to take a decision on economic sanctions through the UN Security Council due to the opposition of China and, to some extent, Russia, contributed to the fact that the US moved to direct negotiations with North Korea
The first round of negotiations took place in new York from 2 to 11 June 1993 and ended with the signing of a joint Declaration, the main point of which was the DPRK's commitment to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. the US, in turn, guaranteed North Korea that it would not use nuclear weapons against it. The parties pledged to respect each other's sovereignty and observe the principle of non-interference in internal Affairs. In the third paragraph of the Declaration, the parties expressed support for the process of peaceful unification of the Peninsula. The second round of talks between the American and North Korean delegations took place in Geneva from July 14 to 19. The main result of this round was the agreement in principle of the United States to support the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea. The DPRK has pledged to resume consultations with the IAEA, as well as to re-enter into negotiations with South Korea on a wide range of issues.
However, the main problem was that the US and North Korea had different views on the item on IAEA inspections. The United States believes that all sites should be inspected, including two undeclared ones, while North Korea has agreed to allow observers only to the declared sites. Only by the end of 1993 was an agreement reached, under which the DPRK allowed inspections at seven nuclear facilities and resumed dialogue with the ROK in exchange for the US suspending the Team Spirit program and setting a date for the third round of negotiations. The third round of talks was scheduled for July 1994, but it was interrupted by the death of Kim Il Sung. However, after four months of meetings, a framework agreement was concluded between the United States and the DPRK on 21 October 1994 in Geneva. In accordance with this agreement, North Korea has pledged to stop building a nuclear reactor, abandon work on obtaining plutonium, dismantle the most suspicious facilities, allow IAEA inspectors into the country, and so on. In fact, this meant curtailing the DPRK's nuclear program. A special international consortium, the Korean Peninsula energy development organization (KEDO), was created to solve the North's energy problem. Korea. As part of the KEDO, two light-water reactors were to be built in the DPRK by 2003. It is believed that it is almost impossible to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from such reactors.
Until the late 1990s, the situation around the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear program remained relatively stable. This was due to both the "solar heat" policy pursued by the South and the" soft landing " policy (soft landing, support for North Korea's reform from within) pursued by the United States. It should also be noted that economic difficulties, natural disasters (floods), famine, as well as three years of mourning for the death of Kim Il Sung, to some extent caused the moderate nature of North Korean policy. A new crisis over the North Korean nuclear program broke out in 2002, although its origins can be attributed to 2001.
1.3 D.Trump and Kim Jong Un’s negotiations in the period up to 2017-2019
U.S-North Korea talks: results of the Hanoi summit
The US-North Korea summit in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 27-28 became the second dialogue platform between representatives of the political leadership of the two countries to resolve the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The parties hoped to reach a mutually acceptable agreement that would satisfy both sides of the negotiation process. But despite this, the negotiations ended ahead of schedule, which means that the participants in the process could not come to a common decision regarding those negotiations. Based on this, the problem of denuclearization remains relevant for the regional security system. Therefore, the issue of non-proliferation and preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula will still remain relevant.
Foreign policy prospects in the context of a diplomatic dialogue
between the DPRK and U.S
During the last summit in Singapore, the parties determined their priorities for further negotiations. The administration of Donald trump puts its priority on the complete denuclearization of the DPRK, which means the elimination of nuclear and missile infrastructure facilities and technical means for uranium enrichment. Kim Jong-UN makes it his top priority to provide "security guarantees" for his regime, which primarily means curtailing joint military exercises between the US and South Korea, significantly reducing the US military contingent in South Korea, and withdrawing us tactical nuclear weapons.
The main feature of the negotiation process is that the issues under consideration represent an important role for the national security system of each of the parties.The main and initial priority of Donald trump is the elimination of the DPRK's nuclear Arsenal in the form of three components: nuclear charges, means of delivering nuclear weapons and technical facilities for uranium enrichment. During the talks, the us side will insist on long-term and detailed inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities, which include a nuclear test site, ICBM launch sites, storage sites for nuclear charges and means of delivery, as well as uranium enrichment facilities. The process of eliminating nuclear weapons under the supervision of the international community may take approximately six months to 2-3 years of long-term inspections. Monitoring and monitoring of the "return potential" of nuclear weapons, te, will play an important role in future inspections. its complete technical elimination. US actions at the doctrinal level are spelled out in the framework of the strategy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies.
In terms of tactical significance, the success of the negotiations will play an important role for Donald trump's political bonuses in the next election. But nevertheless, despite the rhetoric of the parties during last year's summit, the prospects for denuclearization of the DPRK remain vague. Nuclear weapons are a guarantee of the preservation and survival of the North Korean regime at the international level. This is due to the following factors: on the one hand, at the political and psychological level, nuclear weapons serve as a mechanism of influence on the international community, where internal propaganda presents Kim Jong-UN as a familiar figure of global politics, on the other hand, nuclear weapons play a deterrent role. Hypothetically, in the event of a military intervention by the United States and its allies, primarily South Korea, the DPRK may retaliate against the territory of South Korea, Japan, and partially the United States, as well as US military bases in the far East. In the event of the overthrow of the regime of Kim Jong-UN, the strike may have a counter-value character, namely, at civilian infrastructure facilities. According to the opinions of military experts, the average number of dead may be 5OO.thousand people. This certainly serves as a deterrent from attacking North Korea, although this action is unlikely and most likely theoretical, since neither the US nor the DPRK is directly interested in a military clash. For Kim Jong-UN, first of all, the priority is to preserve his personal power for the long term. for the United States, this is a huge human and material loss among the Americans themselves and their allies. Therefore, the military scenario, despite the bellicose rhetoric of both sides, remains a vague prospect for implementation. Appeal to military rhetoric is blackmail and a mechanism for foreign policy and diplomatic influence.
For the North Korean side, the priority during the ongoing diplomatic negotiations is to ensure "security guarantees". The North Korean side under" security guarantees " means the following actions of the United States:
* Termination of annual us and ROK military exercises;
* Reduction or elimination of the US military contingent in South Korea;
* Lifting of sanctions and providing humanitarian assistance.
For the US, military bases in South Korea play an important role in maintaining a system of" security guarantees " to US allies. Despite the traditional rhetoric of Donald trump that the allies themselves must ensure their national security, the principles of security guarantees to allies are the cornerstone of maintaining US military dominance at the global level. Therefore, the US will not resort to eliminating military bases on the territory of South Korea. US military bases play an important role in the context of containing China, and the physical presence of the US armed forces is necessary to curb the PLA's military growth and activity in the Asia-Pacific region. The prospects of the US military contingent on the Korean Peninsula are also being formed within the framework of the Sino-American military rivalry in the region. Despite the official statements of Donald trump about providing Kim Jong-UN with "security guarantees", the reduction and elimination of military bases is uncertain, the only real action that the American leader can take is to suspend military exercises in the near future.
The logic of nuclear deterrence dictates that the parties pursue a policy of bargaining through blackmail. But the case of the DPRK may have a slightly different character, in contrast to the classic model of nuclear deterrence strategy, the very absence of nuclear weapons from the DPRK will lead to political stability and the us refusal to engage in offensive diplomacy. A military scenario for the middle East option is highly unlikely, so the main problem of nuclear bargaining lies in the very thinking of Kim Jong-UN, that only nuclear weapons can ensure the survival of the regime.
At the foreign policy level, the bilateral talks can be described as a victory for Kim Jong-UN. the North Korean leadership took seriously Donald trump's threats to launch pre-emptive strikes in early 2017. Against the background of political blackmail and speculation of threats, the military and political leadership of the DPRK decided not to go to a military confrontation with the United States. The decision to normalize relations with the United States was made to prevent the development of a military scenario.
The tactical victory of Donald trump lies in his media plane, as the us President showed Congress and the public that he is able to solve the problem of the Korean Peninsula and won bonuses for the upcoming elections. If successful negotiations are held and agreements are reached on the Korean Peninsula, the US President may be nominated for the Nobel peace prize, which will certainly give him weight for future elections.
Domestic economic and socio-economic transformation is also important for the political process stabilizations. So, before the start of the second summit, Donald trump repeatedly stated that " North Korea will become a missile, but another - an economic missile." Thus, the American leader hinted at internal reforms, primarily economic transformations. One of the reasons for choosing Vietnam as the venue for the second summit was the country's economic and diplomatic experience, during which Vietnam restored diplomatic relations with the United States and whose economy switched to a market economy. For the United States , this is the most acceptable and final scenario in which Kim Jong-UN can adopt and implement the experience of Vietnam's economic reforms and still maintain his rule. The policy of economic liberalization and openness of the DPRK will lead to the integration of the country into the system of regional relations based on dynamic trade and economic cooperation and reduce the aspects of military security.
The results of the summit in Hanoi
The summit in Hanoi ended ahead of schedule, during which the parties did not reach a common conclusion. According to Donald trump, Kim Jong-UN considered only the option of partial denuclearization and complete lifting of sanctions, which the American side could not agree with.
It is also a remarkable fact that during the summit, Donald trump often spoke in his speeches about the need for North Korea to adopt economic reforms according to the Vietnam scenario. The US President has repeatedly stressed the significant economic potential of North Korea, and in any case, we can say that the second unofficial diplomatic strategy of the US in relation to the DPRK is to promote the policy of economic liberalization. But the leadership of the DPRK is aware of the social and political changes that can occur inside the country, which are far from a happy outcome for the political elite. Perhaps, in this case, an important role is played by the history of a large-scale famine that took place in the second half of the 90s under the rule of Kim Jong-Il. The discovery and receipt by ordinary North Koreans of alternative information about this event may undermine the legitimacy of the authorities. This may be one of the main reasons for the possible collapse of the Kim Jong-UN regime.
Kim Jong-UN sees the problems of economic reform policy in a slightly different way. Kim Jong-UN's main strategy is to achieve uninterrupted supplies of goods and material through the complete lifting of sanctions, i.e., full-fledged trade with the PRC and the provision of humanitarian assistance. These actions, in turn, will help to obtain the necessary material and economic support without the need for economic liberalization, which may lead to further socio-political instability.
To preserve the regime, the North Korean leader will demonstrate loyalty in the near future and after the us elections, and will not take any provocative actions. Kim Jong-UN's main policy is to expect a change in the White house administration, the us presidential election in 2020. First, Kim Jong-UN will not implement any significant changes in the domestic political system, not according to the Chinese or Vietnamese scenario, as the American side would like. Secondly, nuclear weapons remain an essential foreign policy deterrent and guarantee the security and preservation of the North Korean regime.
Thus, at the end of the summit, we can draw the following conclusions: the policy of threats and blackmail has opened up opportunities for a strategic dialogue between the parties. The overall strategy of Kim Jong-UN was to stretch the expectation of the presidency of Donald trump: Kim Jong-UN proposed holding talks, and he also stretched the negotiation process, and also played an important political and psychological factor, since the leaders of both sides called each other" friends", which in turn reduces the level of psychological tension. From the point of view of nuclear diplomacy, this is an absolute victory for the North Korean leader. For the United States, the summit has become a strategic opportunity for a dialogue platform, if the denuclearization of the Peninsula is successfully completed within the framework of the non-proliferation doctrine. The overall strategy of the United States, in addition to its nuclear component, is to maintain and give momentum to policy implementation economic liberalization, as Donald trump himself has repeatedly stated. However, the policy of desirable economic liberalization faces two contradictions: the nuclear issue puts the North Korean leader in the epicenter international attention, and in the case of renouncing nuclear weapons and pursuing a policy of economic liberalization, Kim Jong-UN loses the international "authority" of his power, turning into a local king. Also, economic liberalization can challenge the ideological monopoly, which will cause socio-political uncertainty within the country.
The DPRK will maintain its nuclear potential, however, the country's military-political leadership will not take any open and provocative actions. Most likely, the DPRK will focus on developing technology for miniature warheads to be installed on ICBMs. This, in turn, will cause a round of further diplomatic friction between the participants in the denuclearization process.
CHAPTER 2
2.1 Political features of the North Korean regime
The political structure of the country is certainly supported by the use of state terror, especially brutal under Kim Jong-UN. Experts ' opinions on the North Korean Peninsula are similar. All of them imply the DPRK as the most closed state with the most totalitarian regime in the world, which I can't deny and agree with the majority. The North Korean system has three main features: a one-party system, sole management board, and inheritance of power, I will also try to tell the pros and cons of each of them separately, furthermore I’m going to define the doctrine of Juche and story behind it. Next I will consider the foreign policy feature of the Korean Peninsula, Supreme people's Assembly, DPRK’s defense Committee, and how does the North Korean regime function?
One-Party system
The existence of a one-party system was characteristic of most socialist countries. The ruling party is at the very top of the political structure, and all three traditional branches of government – the legislative, Executive, and judicial-are below it. The party not only governs the state, it commands public organizations and governs the destinies of people. Based on this, North Korea can be called a "party state". At the same time, there are other parties, but they do not constitute the opposition, but are linked to each other. In North Korea, the ruling party is the labour party of Korea.
The one-party system is called totalitarianism. It allows you to concentrate all the forces of the state on solving a single task (to win the war, build communism, etc.). However, the interests of the people are quickly forgotten and soon the main thing is to preserve the power of those who are now with it (for example, Putin and United Russia, Kim Jung Un and DPRK).
Sole management Board
Sole management board is a characteristic feature of a dictatorial regime. If state power is concentrated in the ruling party, then within the party power is in the hands of a single leader. The word " monolithic "in North Korea is usually used in the expression "monolithic ideological system". But the author of this ideological system is the Leader. In North Korea, the leader is "the embodiment of the organized will of the party"," the commander-in-chief of the socio-political organization", that is, North Korea. Therefore, the role and power of the leader are absolute and indisputable.
Pros
- Quick decision-making (the army is a model of dictatorship)
- Ability to overcome the resistance of special interest groups
- The only possible way to make a decision when the parties are antagonistic (for example, in the labor collective or in the army)
- Education of "wild" fellow citizens by an enlightened dictator
Consequently, the more heterogeneous the managed system (ethnically, materially, mentally, etc.), the more likely it is that a dictatorship will be the way to keep it afloat.
Cons
However, the infantile disease of fascination with dictatorship quickly passes, and the shortcomings of dictatorial rule come to the scene.
- The dictator's humanity. The dictator is an ordinary person, for him always and in everything "the shirt is closer to the body". Therefore, sooner or later, the dictator will begin to redistribute resources from distant to close ones. Whether it's relatives, party mates, or childhood friends.
- The utility function of the dictator is usually not the same as the utility function of the governed. Of course, this option is possible when the governed are forced to act for their own good. But most often it is just a "divorce". The governed understand that they are given less than they are taken away. They either run, go suffer, or overthrow the dictator.
Inheritance of power
North Korea is unique in that its Stalinist government provided an example of successful succession of power as a logical continuation of sole rule. The dynastic system guarantees that the right to take the post of" commander-in-chief " is inherited on the basis that the heir has fully inherited the thoughts, abilities and skills of his father.
Preparations for dynastic rule began in the early 1970s. the formation of this system was completed when Kim Il sung announced that " Kim Jong Il is fully capable of assuming the duties of (leader)". After the death of Kim Il Sung and the appointment of Kim Jong Il as General Secretary of the CPC in October 1997, the dynastic system of power worked successfully when Kim Jong Il took over as Chairman of the State defense Committee in September 1998.
Pros and Cons
The Doctrine of Juche
The word "Juche" - " Lord of all things". This doctrine was intended to combine the teachings of Marxism-Leninism with the mentality of East Asians. It preached an isolationist policy, feeding them ideas of militarism, autocracy, and authoritarianism. Like the precepts of Stalin, the Juche ideology was focused on building communism in one country, and that state was North Korea. The term "Juche" was first used in a speech by Kim Il Sung in December 1955, at the earliest stage of the campaign to eliminate Soviet influence. In his speech, he said that it is necessary to emphasize national traditions, hang paintings by Korean, not Soviet artists, study Korean poets, not poets from the USSR— and described all this with the expression "establishment of Juche".
In fact, the term was well known to Korean nationalists, who had used it since the twenties. In Russian, the word "Juche" is translated as " subject "or " subjectivity", but it would be more accurate to translate it as"identity"or even"self".
By the way, employees of the Soviet Embassy, who closely followed the situation, reported that this term was introduced into widespread use not by Kim Il Sung himself, but by his adviser on ideology, Kim Jang man, who, as the Embassy said, "is very proud of it". However, the inventor of the official ideology ended badly: in the mid-sixties, he disappeared without a trace from the political arena, and his name was forbidden to be mentioned in official texts.
The term "Juche" was turned into an ideology — or rather, into its semblance-in the mid-1960s.all the grounds for this turn of ideological policy were formed at that time. Relations between the USSR and China were extremely tense, it came to military clashes. Both Moscow and Beijing tried to win North Korea over to their side. Kim Il-sung was not going to participate in the conflict, and in this situation he needed to acquire an ideology that could justify his claim to neutrality-and neutrality with a touch, so to speak, of his own theoretical superiority. In the early 1970s, the North Korean leadership, in which Kim Jong Il, the eldest son and heir of Kim Il Sung, played a major role, tried to break with the Marxist-Leninist ideological legacy. At first, "Juche ideas"were presented as a local version of Marxism, or, to quote the 1972 Constitution of the DPRK," a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to Korean reality.
But in the early 1970s, North Korean ideologues, including Kim Jong Il himself, had already argued that "Juche ideas" were not just a variant of Marxism, but a new and universal progressive theory. It was assumed that Marxism itself was such a theory in the time of capitalism, Leninism began to play this role in the era of imperialism, and in the conditions of the collapse of the colonial system and the emergence of new independent States, this role automatically passed to the "Juche ideas", which were then called "kimirsenism". Then Kim Jong-Il stressed that there is a fundamental difference between "Juche ideas" and Marxism.
However, this line did not develop and was curtailed in the late 1970s, so that in later periods the connection between "Juche ideas" and Marxism-Leninism remained unclear. Most likely, this reaction was caused by the fact that radical statements could negatively affect Pyongyang's relations with other socialist countries, which at that time were all (at least in words) Marxist-Leninist ideocracies. However, since the late 1960s, the number of references to Marxism-Leninism in the official North Korean press has steadily declined.
Связь внутриполитической и внешнеполитической дилеммы Северокорейского режима
North Korean Military Strategy (Перевод)
North Korea appears determined to maintain its “songun” policy of putting its military first, as well as its “byungjin” line of striving for economic developments while also building nuclear weapons. North Korea’s desire to strengthen its deterrent posture has enabled continued military investment despite severe economic conditions throughout the country. The DPRK maintains a military comprising 1.2 million personnel, including 1 million in the army, 60,000 in the navy, and 120,000 in the air force. The ROK 2014 Defense White Paper estimates North Korea fields 74 maneuver brigades consisting of 4,300 tanks, 2,500 armored vehicles, 8,600 cannons, and 5,500 multiple rocket launchers.42 The navy reportedly possesses 430 combatant vessels, 260 amphib- ious ships, 20 mine warfare vessels, and 70 submarines. The air force fields 820 combat aircraft, 30 surveillance and control aircraft, 330 transport craft, 170 trainers, and 300 helicopters. North Korea has one of the world’s largest special operations forces, estimated at 60,000 to 180,000.
Total reservists are assessed at over 7 million. While these numbers sound forbidding, the qual- ity of the forces are low and deemed to have deteriorated due to poor training, food shortages, dilapidated equipment, and lack of fuel. Nevertheless, artillery remains a major threat given its proximity to Seoul. DPRK submarine forces also pose a danger in the northwest islands and to ROK surface vessels as evidenced by North Korea’s torpedoing of the Cheonan corvette in 2010, which killed 46 South Korean sailors in the largest military loss of life on the peninsula since the Korean War.
North Korea has focused resources on the development of asymmetric capabilities. It conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, all at the same test site. Preparations continue at this site, and North Korea could conduct a fourth test with little warning.43 In recent years, Pyongyang has augmented its plutonium-based weapons program with a new and clandestine program based on highly enriched uranium. There is little information available on this second program, but in February 2015, Chinese scientists reportedly estimated that North Korea currently has 20 nuclear weapons. They also estimated that Pyongyang possesses the uranium-enrichment capacity to build 40 weapons by the end of the Obama administration’s term. This is higher than the West- ern estimate of 8–16 weapons.44
North Korea currently has over 700 ballistic missiles and is actively seeking an intercontinen- tal missile capable of carrying a warhead to the continental United States. In January 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates estimated this could happen within five years.45 In May 2015, North Korea claimed it is now capable of mounting a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile targeting the United States. DPRK short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and long-range artillery can reach every U.S. base in Japan and South Korea. The regime also possesses one of the largest chemical weapon stockpiles in the world.46 The March 2013 cyber intrusion against South Korean banks and television stations and the November 2014 hack of Sony Pictures demonstrate North Korea’s growing asymmetric capabilities.
In addition to the risk of conventional or nuclear attack on its neighbors, North Korea also pres- ents an instability risk, with the potential for a rapid collapse of centralized state control. Kim Jong-un faces the dictator’s dilemma—the state must open up to survive, but the process of opening up could lead to the collapse of the regime.47 There is credible evidence that the po- tential for a dramatic erosion of regime control is possible. The leadership is incapable of reform and opening up to market transactions with the outside world and accepting information inflows would erode the legitimacy of the regime and collapse the system. On the other hand, main- taining the status quo is not sustainable in the long term. The numbers of refugees continues to grow, the economy remains underdeveloped, and China’s generosity in making up for the DPRK’s flaws is not eternal. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s tightening of political control over the country is
in juxtaposition to a society that is more knowledgeable of the outside world, less dependent on the state as a result of two decades of informal and official markets, and desirous of a better life. Rigid political structures and a liberalizing society is an unworkable combination. We do not know what the trigger will be, but this system cannot continue indefinitely.
Thus, the bottom line is that Korean unification is not a matter of if, but when. A collapse of regime control, however, would immediately create major security challenges. The refugee flow both north and south would be substantial, requiring a massive humanitarian assistance pro- gram. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology would also need to be secured. Moreover, geopolitical tensions would arise between visions of a united Korea closely aligned with China and one that remains allied with the United States. These tensions would erupt in the midst of a highly uncertain crisis, requiring quick reaction and careful coordination between political and military leaders throughout the region.
The United States will have to work closely with regional allies and partners to address Pyong- yang’s nuclear program, missile development, and illicit activities, as well as the risk of an internal collapse of regime control. Managing escalation in such contingencies will be vital not only with North Korea but also with other regional states like China and Russia.
Regional context
North Korea occupies a Central place in the parameters of the security system of the Far East. The dynamics of regional security issues in the context of the DPRK cover directly the security issues of South Korea, Japan, the United States, and indirectly Russia and China.
China's position on North Korea is complex. China generally supports maintaining a stable political situation in the Asia-Pacific region and is not interested in increasing military escalation. China faces two options in resolving the North Korean dilemma: on the one hand, maintaining North Korea's statehood is necessary to maintain a buffer with Pro-American South Korea. On the other hand, the threat to the DPRK is to provoke the US to military action. Also, in the event of hostilities, China will Express a strong protest about the large us military presence near its North-Eastern borders, which, in turn, may lead to an increase in Sino-American tensions. If the regime of Kim Jong-UN is eliminated, China will be "squeezed" by the US on the Korean Peninsula, in the region of the South China sea and the Taiwan Strait within the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing will be satisfied with maintaining the regime of Kim Jong-UN with subsequent economic reforms that will help preserve regional stability. If the leadership of the DPRK decides to liberalize the economy, China will certainly become one of the leading investors in the North Korean economy. Reaching an agreement between the US and the DPRK will have direct consequences for the security of South Korea. As noted by South Korean President moon Jae-In, Seoul welcomes the second round of the summit, although it is noteworthy that South Korea is not a participant in the negotiations. If the North Korean nuclear potential is eliminated, the permanent threat to South Korea will disappear, which in turn may affect the state and prospects of the American military contingent on the Korean Peninsula. However, if the negotiations are successful, the security of South Korea will be achieved, which will be guaranteed by the absence of the DPRK's nuclear potential itself. If the summit is completed successfully, the significance of the military aspect of the Korean Peninsula issue will be leveled. Despite the fact that the issue of unification is the Central agenda of the Peninsula, we should not expect any drastic changes in this issue. North and South Korea will maintain their political sovereignty, even though relations have improved.
Japan also views the DPRK as a source of threat to its national security. In General, Japan supports holding the DPRK-US summit and attempts to improve relations between the countries. Japan puts its priorities on resolving the following issues: the return of its citizens who were kidnapped by North Korean intelligence in the 70s and 80s, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and improving economic ties with the DPRK. For Japan, it is crucial to eliminate North Korea's nuclear potential, which is a threat in the form of a counter-value strike on civilian infrastructure, since in the case of a hypothetical conflict, Japan also becomes a hostage to the DPRK's retaliatory strike. As noted by Mitoji Yabunaka, a former representative of the Japanese side for the six-party talks, Japan expresses a number of doubts about the success of the negotiations, which can be "half-baked, deceptive agreements". Japan also considers the US military contingent on the Korean Peninsula as a deterrent to the growth of China's military potential. Therefore, the range of Japanese-American relations is not limited exclusively to the issue of a nuclear missile attack by the DPRK, but also to the military factor of China.
If positive results of the negotiation process are achieved, Japan can start providing appropriate economic support to the DPRK. Thus, secret negotiations are being held between the parties on the return of kidnapped Japanese citizens to their homeland. Japan will continue to support Washington's diplomatic efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Russia is one of the North's allies, which provides diplomatic and moral assistance, especially within the UN Security Council. A military confrontation between the DPRK and the U.S. and its allies does not represent a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation in the far East, but nevertheless, the Russian diplomatic strategy will focus either on maintaining the status quo, either for economic transformation of the DPRK by Vietnamese or Chinese script. Although there is no threat of a military confrontation between Russia and the United States in the Far East, in the event of increased military escalation in the region, the Russian foreign Ministry will protest with the increased presence of the US armed forces in the region. Therefore, Russia is interested in a peaceful settlement of the DPRK and the United States.
Отношения КНДР и Китая
For North Korea, the lifeline provided by China is paramount to its existence. Without China, the North Korean economy would cease to function; China provides for approximately 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade.10 North Korea’s mineral exports to China have been a major source of hard currency for its impoverished economy. As the largest importer of North Korean mineral products, China has participated in 20 North Korean 7. mining projects and remains Pyongyang’s leading mining project investor.11 North Korea’s anthracite coal is its major export item; China is the sole recipient.12 North Korea’s anthracite exports to China increased 15.5 percent in 2013 compared to the previous year, with shipments totaling US$1.37 billion.13 Although North Koreans bristle at Chinese treatment of them like a poor province, dictating the terms of all interactions, they have little choice given their isolated and dependent state. Pyongyang’s continued nuclear and missile tests in the face of Chinese opposition have been an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership, with frustration growing in Beijing. In response to a North Korean nuclear test in February 2013, China summoned North Korea’s ambassador to communicate Beijing’s strong dissatisfaction. The execution of Jang Sungthaek in December 2013 further shocked Chinese government offi cials as Jang was China’s main interlocutor and was regarded as a promoter of economic reform in North Korea. Thus far, Beijing has not doubled down on its North Korean stakes by embracing the young leader Kim Jong- un who has yet to pay a visit to China. But it is not clear how long China can tolerate losing its main contact inside the regime, with no evidence of a replacement. North Korea and China’s historical ties, combined with both countries’ strategic and security interests, create a partnership that cannot be easily broken. Despite the noticeable and growing strains in the bilateral relationship, China continues to support and maintain its relations with North Korea because of its strategic signifi cance. However, cracks have slowly begun to emerge. These cracks in the relationship provide an opportunity for South Korea to further engage with China and shape Beijing’s policies toward Pyongyang.
Strategic environment within the Asia-Pacific region
Central and incentive factor of the geopolitical evolution of Asian-Pacific Region is China`s ascendancy. China`s geopolitical pattern generates a new regional process across the region, involving many regional nation-states, and as a steady growing power affecting its peripheral neighbors around its borders. Taking China`s in Asian geographical landmass [22, р. 10] it makes China central in the geopolitical processes occurring in Asian continent. Nowadays, the period after the end of cold war period, it has shifted a global military-political security issues and security parameters in Asia, which inherently is defined by the strategic and vital geopolitical areas for sustaining of American hegemony. As was mentioned by famous Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his work «The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order» in the new global political environment a challenge for US would be led from Political Islam and China. These two civilizational- geopolitical actors which would define a global agenda in various issues [37]. Sure these processes are profound in terms of historical transcendentalism for our time.
Since initiating Deng Xiaoping`s reform in the late of 1970s and declaring of Policy of Reforms and openness for outer world, China`s GDP has shown a steady and remarkable growth. During two decades of undeniable strength of its economic power, China in accordance with logic of realism has started to accumulate its power strength in other spheres. Realist logic proposes a step by step logic of development: accumulating of economic power leads to its financial strength. There are three main pillars of state`s power: economy, military and domestic political strength and stability. Since beginning of 90s and this process itself increased in the midst of 2000, People`s Liberation Army steady modernization process and ability to perform missions and operations in the new, strategic levels. But the issue of utility of military power is under the question in the contemporary conditions, due to global interdependence growth which is far away from classical system of previous international epochs. But nonetheless this radical changes and transformations do not deny the security dilemma issue in the Asia-Pacific. Third main political change is the building of China and its neighbor’s links in Asia. Here, in this part general issues are mixed with three directions: maritime disputes, especially over South China Sea, as a result of this arms race and issues of economic cooperation among state regions which is based on multilateral issues. Here, the near term perspective in the institutional framework agenda it`s a building of system of regional relations. The most actual agenda over Asian-Pacific is the building of regional institutions. Regional institutions itself in this context have a geopolitical pretext in the existence of types of political links in the region. The specific of regional institutions have two dimensional levels: first, diplomatic and legal in order to build a legally mechanisms that enforce the law of leading party and second - economic, the regulation of economic relations.
Since China`s aggrandizement its power and shaping of new strategic environment in globe, there are many questions what kind of regional structure would be and what would accompany it?
China was by far the biggest and most important case of the liberal-authoritarian dilemma. In that period dominating idea in the context of ideological confrontation, liberal concept itself is on that market economy could not exist without democratic political institutions. In the light of this idea many thought and anticipated that economic changes eventually would entail political, i.e. liberalization of political system is inevitable. Possible China`s transition from authoritarian regime to democracy in terms of foreign policy and broadly in terms of geopolitics could to lower existing tenses and conflicts in the region and would contribute to stability and prosperity within the region.
For China`s neighbors, the question resulting from all this was whether China would grow strong (and aggressive) or become more internally fragmented by uneven development, penetration of foreign capital and ideas, and a weakening political center. The combined impact of marketization (which stimulated mass internal migration, decentralization of power, challenge to authority, corruption, crime, environmental problems, and dangers of structural instability and overheated economic growth) and political uncertainty (succession struggles, loss of ideological authority, rise of nationalism) meant that the outcome of China`s rapid development during the 1980s and 1990s was very had to read. Impressive rates of economic growth, a willingness to increase military expenditure, and occasional forays into aggressive foreign policy all pointed towards China as a potential world-class power in the foreseeable future. But the profound internal contradictions of market communism, the tensions of uneven development between the coast and the interior, the uncertain state of the ruling CCP and its problems of leadership transition, and the widening gap between central and provincial political authority all pointed towards a potentially much more erratic future [62].
These open questions about the future of the political economies of East Asia`s two main powers had huge significance for all other levels of security dynamics. In principle, one could imagine sharply different scenarios for these two great powers within the next couple of decades. At worth, both could be military powerful and nationalistic. At best, both could be rich, democratic, and (to a point) liberal. Or both could remain in something like their present positions. How they would behave, not only towards each other, but also towards region and the world, hung on how their domestic political economies would develop. There was no way of predicting this, and not much consensus on the most likely outcome.
During the 1990s, the patterns of regional security interdependence in Asia underwent an external transformation because of the knitting together of Northeast and Southeast Asia into a single RSC. This knitting together of an East Asian RSC involved two main stories. The first was China-centered, and grew out of the Cold War and earlier security links between China and Southeast Asia.
The military-political story hinges on both the actual and expected rise of China`s power in a regional context that during the 1990s was less constrained by outside powers than at any time during the twentieth century.
The resulting enhancement of China`s weight and freedom of action in East Asia focused attention on its domestic developments, and what kind of state - it was likely to become. If China remained centralized and grew strong, then the question was whether it would be aggressive or benign. Some argued that it would be militarily incapable of serious aggression and its adaptation to international society. Attached to this were two ideas that seemed to amplify it. First was the idea of China as a revisionist power, not closely wedded to the existing international order, and with many territorial, cultural, and status grievances against (especially over Taiwan). Second was the idea that China was a classic model of authoritarian modernization, unrestrained by democracy and vulnerable to nationalism and militarism. Reinforcing these views was China`s continued willingness to resort to aggressive behavior and to the threat or use of force against its neighbors - India, Philippines, Taiwan - and its continued cultivation of historical hatred of Japan. In support of this malign views were China`s cavalier attitude towards nuclear testing and the export of missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran, and the gathering reaction against its unfair and inhumane economic and political practices. Its behavior in the South China Sea, and towards Taiwan, offered a distinctly mixed prospect to those hoping that China could somehow be brought into the regional process of dialogue and diplomacy.
Political expectations from China during 1990s and political expectations from 2000s.
The Chinese military extended their occupations to the more southerly Spratly Islands in 1992, occupying atolls and asserting claims to continental shelf resources, and in 1994 occupied the Mischief Reef, long claimed by the Philippines though not occupied by it. The main vehicle for this reorientation has been the ARF, which came into being in 1994. Japan played a significant role in this development, though eschewing leadership for itself or having its bids turned down. The ARF usefully binds both Japan and China into a regional institutional framework, allowing Japan to address its historical problem, China to address the fears of its neighbors, and both to avoid conspicuous balancing behavior towards each other.
In sum, the case for an emergent East Asian security complex rests on three parallel developments.
• First, a shared concern throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia, about the implications of growing Chinese power.
• Second, the creation, albeit partial and fragile, of institutional security connections linking Northeast and Southeast Asian states.
• Third, the build-up of an East Asian regional economy, which is widely thought within the region to have strong links to politico-military stability.
An examination of a range of possible geopolitical futures for Strategic Asia and an evaluation of the likelihood of each outcome based on the prospective performance of the U.S. and Chinese economies, potential political reform in China, and other factors. Future shape of Strategic Asia will be determined in large part by the power and preference of its two biggest players. If China`s economy falters, the U.S. will remain dominant in at least the eastern portion of this various domain. If the U.S. stumbles, on the other hand, the chances of Chinese hegemony will grow. If both powers remain strong and engaged, Strategic Asia will likely be split along geographic and ideological lines.
The probability of other scenarios will depend on factors that lie outside the realm of normal geopolitical calculation. It is much easier to imagine the U.S. and China collaborating to keep order in Asia if they share the same democratic values and institutions. Similarly, an East Asian community modeled on the European Union is more likely if China liberalizes than if it does not. The geostrategic future of Asia will depend on whether China continues to rise, whether the U.S. retains the economic resources and on the choices and preferences of the two powers. Current trends suggest that Chinese hegemony or the division of the region into continental and maritime spheres of influence is most likely. Given the unlikelihood that China will undergo significant political reform in the near future, the U.S. must craft its regional strategy without continuing on a liberal regional partner.
Serious analysis of the international politics of specific regions, and of the world as a whole, must begin with a consideration of the distribution of hard power. It cannot end there, however. Instead of being fixed, the power balance is constantly changing, sometimes rapidly, thanks to differences in economic growth rates, levels of technological sophistication, and military expenditures. Albeit to varying degrees, these are variables over which national decisionmakers generally have at least some measure of control. The shifting the structure of power shapes the parameters within which states must act, setting limits on what they can achieve and creating imperatives that they ignore at their peril. How quickly and in precisely what ways states react to changing material conditions will depend on their goals and strategies. These, in turn, are the product of a variety of tangible and intangible factors, including the perceptions of key individuals, the power of various societal groups, the domestic political regimes within which they operate, and the content of prevailing ideologies.
The region (Asia) as a whole has continued to grow faster than rest of the world, with the result that its share of global GDP has increased from 33% in 2000 to nearly 40% in 2010.Within Asia itself, China and India remained the growth leaders, with their GDPs advancing at an average annual rate of 9.9% and 7.3%, respectively, between 2000 and 2009, and increasing from a combined total of 34% of the region`s total output in 2000 to 48% in 2010. Thanks to largely an increase in oil prices, Russia managed to hold onto its share of world GDP (growing slightly over the course of the decade from 2.7% to 3.0%), while Japan`s position continued to weaken (its GDP share falling from 7.6% to just under 6%). Both Russia and Japan also entered into what is likely to be an irreversible absolute drop in population, with unfavorable portents for their future prosperity, dynamism, and strength [69] The essential continuity of the region`s economic trend lines, in spite of political upheaval, suggests that they are being driven by deeply rooted demographic and technological forces.
China`s continuing growth has enabled the country to conduct a wide-ranging and rapid modernization of its armed forces and defense industrial base that, in terms of the burden imposed on the national economy, has been all but painless. Whereas at the turn of century it was still commonplace to observe that China`s jets, tanks, ships, and submarines lagged several generations behind those of the United States, the gap in many areas begun to close. More worrisome is the recognition, that China has also been pursuing asymmetric approaches to deterring and defeating potential enemies by developing anti-satellite weapons, large numbers of precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles, and cyber warfare techniques that could prove disproportionately costly and difficult for the United States and its allies to counter.
Economic growth has also given Beijing a variety of tools that it previously lacked, including the ability to promise (or threaten to withhold) aid, investment capital, access to China`s massive market for energy and raw materials, and its seemingly limitless supply of inexpensive labor. In recent years Beijing has become more subtle and sophisticated in using of all these instruments of soft power to enhance its influence and shape its strategic environment. In addition, the mere fact of China`s obvious economic success has boosted its prestige around the world, and its ability to combine growth with authoritarianism has encouraged the perception in some quarters that China provides a workable alternative to Western models of liberal democratic capitalism.
Adherents of «realist» theories of international politics believe that institutions reflect the power and preferences of the nations that make them up rather than any shared commitment to lofty abstract principles. The process of institutional design generally involves political struggle among the potential participants, with each pursing for the plan that best serves its own interest. Such struggle is clearly visible just beneath the surface of recent discussions of a possible East Asian community, with China, Japan, and the United States all trying to shape whatever may ultimately emerge. Not surprisingly, Beijing has tended to favor mechanisms such as ASEAN + 3, in which China would be biggest and most powerful member. Japan, meanwhile, has advanced proposals in which China`s strength would be offset by the addition of other major players (including at a minimum, India, Australia, and New Zealand). The United States has made clear its preference for open, pan-Pacific organizations as opposed to or to put itself in a position where it might seem to be actively opposing the wishes of a substantial group of Asian nations.
As a rising power with expanding ambitions, China has little to gain by locking itself into arrangements that will restrict its future freedom of action or give the United States a perpetual voice in the affairs of the region. Conversely, the weaker powers (especially Japan, but also South Korea and Australia, among others) will be wary of joining organizations that a powerful, opaque China can easily dominate.
Compared to Europe at the close of the Cold War, Asia today remains divided by ideology, history, the lack of any prior experience of regional integration, and a absence of a trusted arbiter and guarantor. The fact that China is authoritarian as well as strong still matters. The regime`s lack of transparency, the absence of any internal checks on its power, and the degree to which the CCP is closed to outside influence make China far more difficult for others to trust than it would be if it were a democracy. In contrast to Germany, Japan`s failure to come to terms adequately with its past, coupled with the CCP`s deliberate efforts to keep Tokyo off balance and alienated from Japan`s other neighbors, has helped to keep the history issue very much alive. Even though several East Asian states maintain strong strategic connections to the United States as part of the latter`s hub-and spokes system, they have never been integrated into anything resembling a true multilateral alliance, and, of course, throughout the Cold War China, Russia, and India remained in orbits of their own. The fact that the United States would not even be a full member of some proposed organizations means that there would be no one to play honest broker, a role that, in any event, China would be exceedingly unlikely to grant [23].
This issue on building of multilateral relations in East Asia under the question. Facts itself propose dominant two models: Sino centric based on bilateral relations and rested on traditional Oriental political model and American in the face of balance of power in economic sense of the TPP.
In order for China to displace the United States as the pole around which Asia is organized, several things would have to happen. First, and most obviously, Beijing would need to find a way to sidestep all the various obstacles just identified and continue on its path of rapid economic and military expansion. Second, the United States would either have to choose or be compelled against its will to withdraw substantially from the region, pulling back its forward-based forces and allowing its alliances and quasi-alliance relationships to be dissolved or drained of any real strategic significance. Third, Beijing would need to find ways to prevent other regional actors from joining together in the absence of the United States to form a countervailing coalition capable of balancing China`s power and challenging its influence.
While it might seem implausible that all these conditions could be achieved simultaneously, they may turn out to be linked in ways that would be achieved simultaneously, they may turn out to be linked in ways that would make them mutually reinforcing. Suppose that China is able to sustain its rapid growth while the United States struggles economically in the wake of the recent financial crisis and remains bogged down in costly counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations in Southwestern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Public opinion polls already show more support for disengagement, if not outright isolationism, that at any time since the end of Vietnam War. The American people are way of China, but they give no indication of wanting to enter into a costly arms race or to compete with China for influence in Asia. To the contrary, they seem at present far more inclined toward tending to their own problems than going out into the world seeking dragons to slay [23, р. 31].
Reveling interim narrowly in Sino-American relations and broadly within regional relations in Asia-Pacific became second decade of XXI century. Sustaining American hegemony despite Republican hawks within the US government domination or restrained Democrats, after Obama`s administration initiating «Pivot to Asia» it became clear that American engagement in Asia-Pacific is inevitable. Regional strategic conditions will be formed under American presence and its active engagement. This event sure in favor for ASEAN nations who seek a counterbalancing Chinese assertive aspirations in solving of local affairs. Next notion and common object in strategic links between two leading geopolitical actors - it`s a perception of American «rebalancing» strategy.