About

CEO of [The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)], a partnership of public, private, philanthropic and civil organizations working to finance and co-ordinate the development of vaccines against COVID-19 and emerging infectious disease threats.

Prior to joining CEPI, I served in the White Houses of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and designed and led medical countermeasure development programs at BARDA and NIH, including planning for and responding to H5N1 avian influenza ("bird flu"), the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and the Ebola, MERS, and Zika epidemics.

Pragmatic, result-oriented, and engaging leader with diplomatic skills and ability to navigate complex stakeholder interaction. Strong advocate for global health security.

Articles [written by] Richard Hatchett

• UK support a vital first step in turning tide against future pandemics ( April 30, 2021 )

• Faster, more agile vaccine tech needed to fight tomorrow’s epidemics ( October 15, 2019 )

• Developing a vaccine to neutralise the threat of MERS ( August 22, 2018 )

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Experience

• Chief Executive Officer of [The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)]
  Apr 2017 - Present4 years 2 months
  Oslo - London - Washington D.C.

• CEPI was launched at Davos in 2017, by the governments of Norway and India, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, and the World Economic Forum, as the result of a consensus that a coordinated, international, and intergovernmental plan was needed to develop and deploy new vaccines to prevent future epidemics.

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  CEPI moved quickly and urgently to respond to the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, working with our vaccine partners to make investments where they can have most…

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• Biomedical Advanced Research & Development Authority

• 6 years 3 months

  • Deputy Director and Chief Medical Officer
    Jan 2011 - Mar 20176 years 3 months
    U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Washington, D.C.

  • Director (Acting)
    Mar 2016 - Nov 20169 months
    Washington D.C. Metro Area

• Director, Medical Preparedness Policy
  National Security Staff, The White House
  Apr 2009 - Jan 20111 year 10 months

• Associate Director for Radiation Countermeasures Research and Emergency Preparedness
  NIH
  Jul 2005 - Jan 20115 years 7 months

• Fellow in Medical Oncology
  Duke Cancer Care Research Program
  Jul 2003 - Jun 20052 years

• Senior Adviser
  Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness
  Jun 2002 - Jun 20042 years 1 month

• Yale Ebola Project (Makokou, Gabon)

• less than a year

  • Clinical Coordinator
    1997 - 1997less than a year

  • Clinical Coordinator
    1997 - 1997less than a year

  • Clinical Coordinator
    1997 - 1997less than a year

• Research Associate
  Copernicus Academy of Medicine
  1992 - 19931 year

Education

• Vanderbilt University School of Medicine ( MD Medicine , 1990 - 1995 )

• Vanderbilt University School of Medicine ( MD Medicine , 1990 - 1995 )

• Vanderbilt University ( BA English, 1985 - 1989 )

Projects

• Co-chair of IOM Workshop: Rapid Response with Medical Countermeasures for Emerging Infectious Diseases (Pandemic Influenza, Ebola, MERS/SARS) ( Mar 2015 - Mar 2015 ) : This IOM Workshop brought together national and international leaders committed to improving global health security through robust public-private partnerships. It addressed the particular challenges of establishing sustainable operational and business models for emerging infectious diseases, using Pandemic Influenza, Ebola and coronaviruses (MERS and SARS) as case studies.

Groups

• Duke TIP Alumni Network

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Prioritizing Investment

At the workshop there was broad recognition that many threats exist, with only limited financial resources to address these threats. Hundreds of thousands of viruses exist, and it is impossible to prepare for all of them, Swerdlow of CDC said. A participant summarized that “we are either paralyzed to inaction because there are too many threats and we don’t know where to start, or we are busy dealing with the threat of the moment.” Pavia added that we need to consider how prepared is prepared enough: What basic science is needed; what regulatory reforms are required; what stage of development should products be taken to; and what platform-based technologies are needed to fulfill an even cost– benefit ratio? However, he acknowledged that if the funding to answer these questions is not available, if the FDA does not work on regulatory pathways, if partnerships cannot be established in the interepidemic period, none of these things will happen at the rate that a response demands.

Incorporating Holistic Assessments and Transparent Needs

Prioritization and transparency are pragmatic keys to moving forward. Participants discussed the feasibility of an IRAT-like tool that could prioritize across threats that are not yet at crisis level. Richard Hatchett, chief medical officer and deputy director at BARDA, noted that BARDA is working on this type of assessment tool. He also emphasized the importance of a holistic assessment, considering not only the biological properties of viruses and hosts but also the social and behavioral contexts in which a disease could emerge to become a crisis. Certain categories of threat would be clearly prioritized (e.g., organisms capable of respiratory transmission; highly lethal viruses, such as hemorrhagic fevers, that will be disruptive with just a few cases). Daszak concurred about the importance of considering the social context. He noted that EcoHealth Alliance does behavioral risk characterization in all of the countries in which it works, interviewing people most at risk to get a sense of how they are connected to the wildlife and where potential spillover incidents could occur. He suggested that the percentage of the gross domestic product spent on health care is also a predictive factor to consider (impacting the ability to report and to manage a disease), as are issues of governance and political corruption (impacting the willingness to report and respond to international authorities).

Mansoura of Novartis said it is informative to look at previous prioritization efforts and their outcomes. For example, there have been six agents on NIAID’s Category A priority pathogens list, including Ebola, since it was created in 2002. Yet, nearly 15 years later, there was not an Ebola vaccine available during the outbreak. The 2012 PHEMCE strategy document gave very ambiguous signals about whether or not an Ebola vaccine was a priority. Conversely though, the private sector looks at those reports very closely to guide their work, she said. Transparency and a clear signal are important. Courage and political will are needed to sustain these investments, she argued, and we are not even asking for a fraction of what we need.

Daszak of EcoHealth Alliance said it is important to be working for the long term on products such as a pan-coronavirus vaccine platform and working on an animal vaccine, but near-term public health control measures, such as changing behavioral risks, increasing infection control in hospitals, are just as critical. Despite the analysis of travel patterns showing a clear risk that people with EVD would arrive in the United States, airports were very slow to enact the simple measure of screening the temperature of arriving passengers, Daszak said. While MCM development is a key piece of the response puzzle, Osterholm of CIDRAP highlighted the need for stronger human and animal surveillance to help guide industry actions and public health interventions together.

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Acknowledging Past Successes

Participants discussed the existence of success stories and models from which to learn. Project Bioshield, after 10 years and $5.6 billion, has yielded 12 MCMs against CBRN threats, 10 of them licensed. Twenty products supported by BARDA have been licensed since BARDA was created in 2006. The animal rule has been used successfully to approve a monoclonal antibody for the treatment of inhalation anthrax. The solutions that have worked in CBRN, influenza, and global health domains were all adapted to the problems they were seeking to solve in those spaces, offered Abdun-Nabi of Emergent BioSolutions. The solution that is going to work for emerging infectious diseases will likely need to be specifically adapted to that domain, he noted. It can draw on many of the other solutions and tools that have been developed in other spaces, but how they are assembled and used will be unique to the emerging infectious disease space.

Importantly, concluded Hatchett of BARDA, a lesson from the Ebola epidemic response is that responding to emerging infectious diseases must be institutionalized as something that the government values, such that it sufficiently organizes, funds, and conducts preparedness and response activities. This will need to involve government partnership with industry partners, and ideally, engagement of global partners. Several participants likened the approach and level of organization and commitment that is needed to the Manhattan Project.¹ In closing, Mansoura acknowledged the progress made and the successes seen thus far, but cautioned that there is much to be done. We must continue to develop, test, and exercise as we are striving toward next-generation capabilities to address known and unknown infectious diseases that will continue to threaten the national health security of the United States for many years to come.

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Biosketches of Invited Speakers and Facilitators

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• Richard Hatchett, M.D., is chief medical officer and deputy director for Strategic Sciences and Management at BARDA within HHS. His primary responsibilities include oversight of programs relating to strategic science and innovation, strategic affairs and reporting, development of science and preparedness policy, human resources, communications, and organizational marketing. Previously, he served as Director for Medical Preparedness Policy on the White House National Security Staff, where he worked on a wide array of issues related to medical countermeasures development, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and pandemic preparedness more broadly. In 2005–2006, he served as Director for Biodefense Policy on the White House Homeland Security Council and was a principal author of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. In this capacity, he helped set policy and devise strategies to mitigate the consequences of a pandemic and promote pandemic preparedness. From 2005 to 2011, he served as associate director for Radiation Countermeasures Research and Emergency Preparedness at NIAID. Dr. Hatchett completed his undergraduate and medical educations at Vanderbilt University, an internship and residency in Internal Medicine at New York Hospital–Cornell Medical Center, and a fellowship in Medical Oncology at the Duke University Medical Center.

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