Program

Aouad, Algorithmic Collusion in Assortment Games

Anderson and Bedre-Defolie, Hybrid Platform Model

Ashlagi et al, Dynamic Matching Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret

Cachon et al, Pricing on Service Platforms Who Should Set Prices

Cashore et al, Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic

Castro et al, Randomized FIFO mechanisms

Li et al, Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms

Freund and Van Ryzin, Pricing Fast and Slow

Kanoria, Dynamic Spatial Matching

Madsen and Vellodi, Insider Imitation

Pakzad-Hurson, Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market Design

Rosaia, Competing Platforms and Transport Equilibrium

Rossi, Competition and Reputation in a Congested Marketplace

Schedule (All times below are EDT)

Session 1: 11:00 am - 12:30 pm

• 11:00 am - Vivek Farias, Learning Treatment Effects in Panels with General Intervention Patterns

• 11:45 am - Anderson and Bedre-Defolie, Hybrid Platform Model

• 12: 05 pm - Madsen and Vellodi, Insider Imitation

Session 2: 1:00 pm - 2:30 pm

• 1:00 pm - Greg Lewis, Consumer-centered platform design

• 1:45 pm - Rosaia, Competing Platforms and Transport Equilibrium

• 2: 05 pm - Cachon et al, Pricing on Service Platforms: Who Should Set Prices

Session 3: 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm (ride-sharing)

• Cashore et al, Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks

• Castro et al, Randomized FIFO mechanisms

• Freund and Van Ryzin, Pricing Fast and Slow

• Kanoria, Dynamic Spatial Matching

Session 4: 3:00 pm - 4:50 pm (information and competition in two-sided markets)

• Aouad, Algorithmic Collusion in Assortment Games

• Ashlagi et al, Dynamic Matching Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret

• Pakzad-Hurson, Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market Design

• Rossi, Competition and Reputation in a Congested Marketplace

• Li et al, Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms