NETWORKS AND COALITIONS

• Targeting in social networks with anonymized information (with S. Shabayek), working paper (2019).
• A game of hide and seek in networks (with B. Dutta and M. Dziubinski), working paper (2019).
• Friend-based ranking (with M. Olckers), working paper (2018, revised 2019).
• An experimental study of parternship formation in social networks (with B. Dutta, S. Robin and M. Zhu), working paper (2016)  revised (2018).
• Efficient partnership formation in networks (with B. Dutta and M. Manea), Theoretical Economics , 14 (2019), 779-811.
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations (with A. van den Nouweland), working paper (2017, revised 2019) .
• Centrality measures in networks (with M. O. Jackson and P. Tebaldi), working paper (2017, revised 2019) .
• Rumors and social networks (with G. Demange and R. Kranton), International Economic Review , 59 (2018), 421-448.
• Coalitions and networks in oligopolies (2018), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization (L. Corchon and M. Marini eds.), Edward Elgar.
• Targeting and pricing in social networks , (2015) The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks (Y. Bramoulle, A. Galeotti and B. Rogers eds.), Oxford University Press .
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games (with A. van den Nouweland) Games and Economic Behavior. 88 (2014), 538-553.
• Pricing in social networks (with N. Quérou), Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013), 263-281.
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (with E. Diamantoudi), International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011), 263-280.
• Social networks, employment and insurance, CESIfo Economic Studies 57 (2011), 183-202.
• Strategic models of coalition and network formation (with B. Dutta) in Handbook of Social Economics (J. Benhabib, A. Bisin and M. O. Jackson, eds.), North Holland, 2010.
• Communication networks with endogenous link strength (with B. Dutta), Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 39-56.
• Informal insurance in social networks (with G. Genicot and D. Ray),  Journal of Economic Theory 143 (2008), 36-58.
• Business Networks. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2^nd Edition, 2008.
• Reciprocity in groups and the limits to social capital (with G. Genicot and D. Ray), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 97 (2007), 65-69
• The formation of networks with transfers among players (with M. Jackson), Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007), 83-110.
• Equilibrium definitions in network formation games (with M. Jackson), International Journal of Game Theory.34 (2006), 305-318.
• Contracting with externalities and outside options (with A. Gomes), Journal of Economic Theory 127 (2006), 172-201.
• Coalition and network formation. In Cognitive economics (P. Bourgine and J. P. Nadal, eds.), Springer, 2004.
• Noncooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In The endogenous formation of economic coalitions (C. Carraro, ed.), Edward Elgar, 2003.
• Noncooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In NewDirections in the Economic Theory of the Environment (C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1997.
•    Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123.

GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC THEORY

• Jeux cooperatifs avec externalites (in French) , Revue d'Economie Politique 127 (2018), 559-578.
• Matching through institutions , (with D. Cantala and D. Gibaja), working paper (2016, revised 2019).
• Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: The role of random priorities , Mathematical Social Sciences 90 (2017), 73-79.
• Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents (with D. Cantala), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2017), 88-122.
• Markovian assignment rules (with D. Cantala), Social Choice and Welfare 40 (2013), 1-25.
• Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents (with N. Houy), Economic Theory 51 (2012), 13-33.
• Cores of combined games (with G. DeClippel), Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 2424-243.
• Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations (with B. Dutta), Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 721-728
• Comparative statics in strategic market games (with R. Amir), Games and Economic Behavior 65 (2009), 7-24.
• Messengers, gatekeepers and speakers: The power of intermediaries in contracting (with G. Genicot), working paper, 2007.
• Agenda control in coalition formation (with S. Rottier), Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (2002), 769-788.
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games (with H. Ferrer), Journal of Economic Theory, 101 (2001), 301-316.
• Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (with H. Ferrer) , Economics Letters, 70 (2001), 83-87.
• Two-sided search, marriages and matchmakers (with H. Ryder), International Economic Review 41 (2000), 93-114.
•   Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies (with S. Ghosal) , Journal of Economic Theory 74 (1997), 368-384.
• Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures, Theory and Decision, 34 (1993), 161-176.

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

• Dynamic protection of innovations through patents and trade secrets (with P. Belleflamme), 2013 revised (2014), working paper.
• Strategic bypass deterrence (with A. Gautier) Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52 (2017), 189-210.
• Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs (with S. Fabrizi and S. Lippert), Economic Theory 58 (2015), 273-303 .
• Sustainable collusion on separate markets (with P. Belleflamme), Economics Letters 99 (2008), 384-386.
• Acces pricing and entry in the postal sector (with A. Gautier), Review of Network Economics 7 (2008), 207-230.
• Access, bypass and productivity gains in competitive postal markets (with A. Gautier), in Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Markets (M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer eds.), Edward Elgar, 2008
• Group and network formation in Industrial Organization : A survey. In Group formation in economics: Networks, clubs and coalitions. (G. Demange and M. Wooders, eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005.
• Market sharing agreements and collusive networks (with P. Belleflamme), International Economic Review 45 (2004), 387-411.
• Networks and coalitions in Industrial Organization, Manchester Studies, 70 (2002), 36-55.
• Multiple shareholders and control contests (with U. Hege), working paper, 2002.
• Price and quantity experimentation: A synthesis (with P. Belleflamme), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19 (2001), 1563-1582.
• Buyers and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods (with S. Ghosal), Review of Economic Design  5 (2000), 129-148.
• Persuasive advertising in Hotelling's model of product differentiation (with D. Manceau), International Journal of Industrial Organization 17 (1999), 557-574.
• Optimal disclosure delay in multistage R & D competition (with P. Markowitz), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14 (1996), 159-179.
• Endogenous structures of association in oligopolies, The RAND Journal of Economics, 26 (1995), 537-556.

APPLIED THEORY, PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

• Cover-ups  (with R. Kranton), working paper (2019).
• Profit-sharing rules and the taxation of internet platforms  (with G. Demange), working paper (2018, revised 2019).
• Taxation and privacy protection on internet platforms (with G. Demange) Journal of Public Economic Theory 20 (2018), 52-66.
• Oates' decentralization theorem with imperfect household mobility (with U. Zenginobuz), International Tax and Public Finance 22 (2015), 353-375.
• Endogenous formation of alliances in contests in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas eds.), Oxford University Press, 2011.
• The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods (with U. Zenginobuz), Review of Economic Design 11 (2007), 199-216.
• Tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers (with U. Zenginobuz), Journal of Public Economics. 90 (2006), 1745-1763.
• When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict (with S. Sanchez Pages and R. Soubeyran), Economics of Governance 7 (2006), 3-29.
• Wedding celebrations as conspicuous consumption: Signaling social status in rural India (with V. Rao and S. Desai), Journal of Human Resources 39 (2004), 675-695.
• Terror as a bargaining instrument: A case study of dowry violence in rural India (with V. Rao), American Economic Review, 92 (2002), 1029-1043.
• Statistical discrimination and social assimilation (with V. Rao), Economics Bulletin, 10 (2001), 1-5.
• Corporate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms (with E. Lefebvre), Economics Letters 65 (1999), 221-225.