NETWORKS AND COALITIONS
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information (with S. Shabayek), working paper (2019, revised 2021).
Friend-based ranking in practice (with M. Olckers) American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 111 (2021), 567-571.
Friend-based ranking (with M. Olckers), working paper (2019), forthcoming American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
A game of hide and seek in networks (with B. Dutta and M. Dziubinski), Journal of Economic Theory, 190 (2020), 105-119.
Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations (with A. van den Nouweland), Games and Economic Behavior , 121 (2020), 32-54 .
An experimental study of parternship formation in social networks (with B. Dutta, S. Robin and M. Zhu), working paper (2016, revised 2018).
Efficient partnership formation in networks (with B. Dutta and M. Manea), Theoretical Economics , 14 (2019), 779-811.
Centrality measures in networks (with M. O. Jackson and P. Tebaldi), working paper (2017, revised 2021) .
Rumors and social networks (with G. Demange and R. Kranton), International Economic Review , 59 (2018), 421-448.
Coalitions and networks in oligopolies (2018), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization (L. Corchon and M. Marini eds.), Edward Elgar.
Targeting and pricing in social networks , (2015) The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks (Y. Bramoulle, A. Galeotti and B. Rogers eds.), Oxford University Press .
Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games (with A. van den Nouweland) Games and Economic Behavior. 88 (2014), 538-553.
Pricing in social networks (with N. Quérou), Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013), 263-281.
Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (with E. Diamantoudi), International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011), 263-280.
Social networks, employment and insurance, CESIfo Economic Studies 57 (2011), 183-202.
Strategic models of coalition and network formation (with B. Dutta) in Handbook of Social Economics (J. Benhabib, A. Bisin and M. O. Jackson, eds.), North Holland, 2010.
Communication networks with endogenous link strength (with B. Dutta), Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 39-56.
Informal insurance in social networks (with G. Genicot and D. Ray), Journal of Economic Theory 143 (2008), 36-58.
Business Networks. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, 2008.
Reciprocity in groups and the limits to social capital (with G. Genicot and D. Ray), American Economic Review PP 97 (2007), 65-69
The formation of networks with transfers among players (with M. Jackson), Journal of Economic Theory 133 (2007), 83-110.
Equilibrium definitions in network formation games (with M. Jackson), International Journal of Game Theory.34 (2006), 305-318.
Contracting with externalities and outside options (with A. Gomes), Journal of Economic Theory 127 (2006), 172-201.
Coalition and network formation. In Cognitive economics (P. Bourgine and J. P. Nadal, eds.), Springer, 2004.
Noncooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In The endogenous formation of economic coalitions (C. Carraro, ed.), Edward Elgar, 2003.
Noncooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In NewDirections in the Economic Theory of the Environment (C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 90-123.
GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC THEORY
The chair allocation problem (with D. Cantala and D. Gibaja), working paper (2022).
Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic form games , (with A. van den Nouweland), Games and Economic Behavior, 130 (2021), 663-683.
Matching through institutions , (with D. Cantala and D. Gibaja), Games and Economic Behavior , 121 (2020), 204-231.
Jeux cooperatifs avec externalites (in French) , Revue d'Economie Politique 127 (2018), 559-578.
Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: The role of random priorities , Mathematical Social Sciences 90 (2017), 73-79.
Dynamic assignment of objects to queuing agents (with D. Cantala), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (2017), 88-122.
Markovian assignment rules (with D. Cantala), Social Choice and Welfare 40 (2013), 1-25.
Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents (with N. Houy), Economic Theory 51 (2012), 13-33.
Cores of combined games (with G. DeClippel), Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010), 2424-243.
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations (with B. Dutta), Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009), 721-728
Comparative statics in strategic market games (with R. Amir), Games and Economic Behavior 65 (2009), 7-24.
Messengers, gatekeepers and speakers: The power of intermediaries in contracting (with G. Genicot), working paper, 2007.
Agenda control in coalition formation (with S. Rottier), Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (2002), 769-788.
Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games (with H. Ferrer), Journal of Economic Theory, 101 (2001), 301-316.
Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (with H. Ferrer) , Economics Letters, 70 (2001), 83-87.
Two-sided search, marriages and matchmakers (with H. Ryder), International Economic Review 41 (2000), 93-114.
Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies (with S. Ghosal) , Journal of Economic Theory 74 (1997), 368-384.
Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures, Theory and Decision, 34 (1993), 161-176.
Hiding and herding in market entry (with S. Fabrizi and S. Lippert), working paper (2018, revised 2022)
Dynamic protection of innovations through patents and trade secrets (with P. Belleflamme), working paper (2013, revised 2014)
Strategic bypass deterrence (with A. Gautier) Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52 (2017), 189-210.
Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs (with S. Fabrizi and S. Lippert), Economic Theory 58 (2015), 273-303 .
Sustainable collusion on separate markets (with P. Belleflamme), Economics Letters 99 (2008), 384-386.
Access pricing and entry in the postal sector (with A. Gautier), Review of Network Economics 7 (2008), 207-230.
Access, bypass and productivity gains in competitive postal markets (with A. Gautier), in Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Markets (M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer eds.), Edward Elgar, 2008
Group and network formation in Industrial Organization : A survey. In Group formation in economics: Networks, clubs and coalitions. (G. Demange and M. Wooders, eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Market sharing agreements and collusive networks (with P. Belleflamme), International Economic Review 45 (2004), 387-411.
Networks and coalitions in Industrial Organization, Manchester Studies, 70 (2002), 36-55.
Multiple shareholders and control contests (with U. Hege), working paper, 2002.
Price and quantity experimentation: A synthesis (with P. Belleflamme), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19 (2001), 1563-1582.
Buyers and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods (with S. Ghosal), Review of Economic Design 5 (2000), 129-148.
Persuasive advertising in Hotelling's model of product differentiation (with D. Manceau), International Journal of Industrial Organization 17 (1999), 557-574.
Optimal disclosure delay in multistage R & D competition (with P. Markowitz), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14 (1996), 159-179.
Endogenous structures of association in oligopolies, The RAND Journal of Economics, 26 (1995), 537-556.
APPLIED THEORY, PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Cover-ups (with R. Kranton), working paper (2019, revised 2022).
Profit-splitting rules and the taxation of multinational digital platforms (with G. Demange) International Tax and Public Finance 28 (2021), 855-889.
Taxation and privacy protection on internet platforms (with G. Demange) Journal of Public Economic Theory 20 (2018), 52-66.
Oates' decentralization theorem with imperfect household mobility (with U. Zenginobuz), International Tax and Public Finance 22 (2015), 353-375.
Endogenous formation of alliances in contests in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas eds.), Oxford University Press, 2011.
The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods (with U. Zenginobuz), Review of Economic Design 11 (2007), 199-216.
Tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers (with U. Zenginobuz), Journal of Public Economics. 90 (2006), 1745-1763.
When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict (with S. Sanchez Pages and R. Soubeyran), Economics of Governance 7 (2006), 3-29.
Wedding celebrations as conspicuous consumption: Signaling social status in rural India (with V. Rao and S. Desai), Journal of Human Resources 39 (2004), 675-695.
Terror as a bargaining instrument: A case study of dowry violence in rural India (with V. Rao), American Economic Review, 92 (2002), 1029-1043.
Statistical discrimination and social assimilation (with V. Rao), Economics Bulletin, 10 (2001), 1-5.
Corporate tax competition, tariffs and multinational firms (with E. Lefebvre), Economics Letters 65 (1999), 221-225.