Welcome to my webpage!
I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management.
My research interests are in applying information economics to questions in corporate finance, accounting, and financial markets.
I will attend the virtual academic job market in the fall/winter of 2020.
Voluntary Disclosure, Price Informativeness, and Efficient Investment - Job Market Paper -
I analyze a manager's decision to disclose private information when the stock market is a source of information for corporate investment-making. A manager with long-term incentives discloses her private information only if it crowds-in informed trading and thus increases the manager's ability to learn from the market. However, this ex-post disclosing behavior results in two crowding-out effects: First, it crowds-out informed trading in situations where the manager withholds her private information. Second, voluntary disclosure results in an ex-ante average decline in price informativeness. Paradoxically, ex-post voluntary disclosure aimed at stimulating informed trading distorts the market's feedback-providing role and restrains efficient investment-making. Long-term incentives induce this disclosing behavior and thus cause a novel form of investment inefficiency.
Here is a 3-minute pitch of my job market paper
Here is a 20-minute presentation of my job market paper
Clustered IPOs as a Commitment Device
I model the strategic interaction of underwriters' decisions of accepting IPO mandates of firms with correlated values. Underwriters act as certifiers and increase the perceived value of issuing firms. Investors, however, take the agency conflict associated with the fee-paying structure of IPOs into account and discount the offer price accordingly. By timely clustering of related IPOs across different underwriters, investment banks expose themselves to the outcome of other concurrent IPOs which results in a mutual disciplining effect. In this way, underwriters can credibly commit themselves to the marketing of high-value firms only. The model suggests that underpricing levels might be a function of underwriter syndicate composition and provides an agency based rationale for the observed cyclicality in IPOs.
Ph.D. in Economics
2015-2021 (expected), Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Germany
2019, Spring, visit at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, USA, Host: Itay Goldstein
M.Sc. in Economics and Finance
2012-2015, University of Tübingen, Germany
B.A. in Banking
2009-2012, Univerity of Applied Sciences (DHBW) Mosbach, Germany