Vitali Gretschko

ZEW and University of Mannheim

Research Interests

  • Market Design
  • Auction Theory
  • Procurement
  • Microeconomic Theory

Curriculum Vitae [pdf]

Publications

  • Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, accepted in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger and A. Wambach) [link]
  • A procurement mechanism to assign refugee quotas, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (2018) [link]
  • Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunication Policy, (2017) (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen)[link]
  • Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin, (2017) (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)[link]
  • Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics, (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
  • Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics, (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)[link]
  • Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory, (2014) (joint with A. Wambach) [link]
  • On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)[link]

Working Paper

  • Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement, revise and resubmit in Management Science (joint with M. Pollrich)[link]
  • Worst-case subjective-belief equilibria in first-price auctions, reject and resubmit in Theoretical Economics (joint with H. Mass) [link]
  • Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values, reject and resubmit in Games and Economic Behavior (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
  • Information design in sequential procurement (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
  • Sequential procurement with limited commitment (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
  • Contract design with limited commitment (joint with A. Wambach)[link]

Work in Progress

  • Social norms and market behavior – Evidence from a large population sample (joint with T. Riem, N. Fugger, P. Gillen, P. Werner)
  • Auctions vs. negotiations: Evidence from procurement professionals (joint with N. Fugger, P. Gillen, G. Kokott, T. Riem)
  • You know me (joint with N. Fugger, M. Praxmarer)

Book Chapters

  • Sustainable Procurement, in CSR and Business Models, (2017) Springer (joint with F. Haas)
  • Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design (edt. M. Bichler and J. Goerree), (2017) (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach)

Further Publications

  • Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (joint with T. Klein and A. Wambach)
  • Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016 (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)

In the Media

  • Méthode d'attribution des fréquences 5G: de choix discutables, Les Echos (joint with O. Bos)
  • Allemagne: ces encheres 5G qui n'en finissent plus..., Les Echos
  • En Allemagne, la 5G a déjà rapporté plus de 5 milliards, Les Echos
  • Bieterschlacht der Telkoriesen, Handelsblatt
  • Was wurde eigentlich aus der 5G Auktion, Bild Zeitung
  • Nochmal gut ausgegangen, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Wambach)
  • Die Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen, Tagesspiegel
  • Finale im Milliardenspiel, Süddeutsche Zeitung
  • Mobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig, Süddeutsche Zeitung (joint with A. Wambach)
  • Die Mär von der Totalen Transparenz, Wirtschaftswoche
  • Plötzlich nützlich, Der Volkswirt, Wirtschaftswoche
  • Von der Analyse zum Design der Märkte, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (joint with A.Wambach)
  • Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Sanches)

Policy Reports

  • Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience [link]
  • Marktdesign für den öffentlichen Hochbau - Machbarkeitsstudie