ZEW and University of Mannheim

Brief CV [pdf]

Research Interests
        Market Design - Auction Theory - Procurement - Microeconomic Theory

  • Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, forthcoming Telecommunication Policy (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen)[link]
  • Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, forthcoming Economic Theory Bulletin (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)[link]
  • Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics, 47 (4), 914-934 (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
  • Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics18 (3), 335-355 (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)[link]
  • Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory, 55 (3), 731-751 (2014) (joint with A. Wambach) [link]
  • On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50, 79-85 (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)[link]
Working Paper
  • Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, revise and resubmit in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger and A. Wambach)[link]
  • Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
  • Contract design with limited commitment (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
Work in Progress
  • Bidding in the presence of ambiguity (joint with L. Ilieva and A. Ockenfels)
  • Robust bidding (joint with H. Mass)
  • Bidding for sports rights (joint with P. Gillen)
  • Sequential procurement with limited commitment (joint with M. Pollrich)
Book Chapters
  • Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, prepared for the Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, forthcoming  (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach)
In the Press
  • Von der Analyse zum Design der Maerkte, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.09.2016, (joint with A.Wambach)
  • Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016 (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)
  • Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann, Wirtschaftswoche, 02.12.2016, (joint with A. Sanches)

Policy Reports
  • Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach) [link]

    Last updated: November 2016