ZEW and University of Mannheim

Brief CV [pdf]

Research Interests
        Market Design - Auction Theory - Procurement - Microeconomic Theory

  • A procurement mechanism to assign refugee quotasJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (2018) [link]
  • Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction,  Telecommunication Policy, (2017) (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen)[link]
  • Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin, (2017) (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)[link]
  • Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics,  (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
  • Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics, (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)[link]
  • Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory, (2014) (joint with A. Wambach) [link]
  • On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)[link]
Working Paper
  • Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, revise and resubmit (2nd round) in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger and A. Wambach)
  • Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values, reject and resubmit in Games and Economic Behavior (joint with A. Wambach)
  • Sequential procurement with limited commitment (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
  • Contract design with limited commitment (joint with A. Wambach)
  • Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions (joint with H. Mass)[link]
Work in Progress
  • Social Norms and Market Behavior – Evidence from a large population sample (joint with T. Riem, N. Fugger, P. Gillen, P. Werner)
  • Bidding for sports rights (joint with P. Gillen)
Book Chapters
  • Sustainable Procurement, in CSR and Business Models, (2017) Springer  (joint with F. Haas)
  • Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design (edt. M. Bichler and J. Goerree), (2017) (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach)
Sonstige Veröffentlichungen
  • Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, forthcoming in Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (joint with T. Klein and A. Wambach)
  • Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016 (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)
In the Press
  • Mobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29.04.2018 (joint with A. Wambach)
  • Die Mär von der Totalen Transparenz, Wirtschaftswoche, 09.01.2018
  • Plötzlich nützlich, Der Volkswirt, Wirtschaftswoche, 42.2017
  • Von der Analyse zum Design der Märkte, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 05.09.2016, (joint with A.Wambach)
  • Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann, Wirtschaftswoche, 02.12.2016, (joint with A. Sanches)

Policy Reports
  • Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach) [link]

    Last updated: November 2016