Vitali Gretschko

Publications

• Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, accepted in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger and A. Wambach) [link]
• A procurement mechanism to assign refugee quotas, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (2018) [link]
• Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunication Policy, (2017) (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen)[link]
• Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin, (2017) (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)[link]
• Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics, (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
• Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics, (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)[link]
• Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory, (2014) (joint with A. Wambach) [link]
• On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)[link]

Working Paper

• Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement revise and resubmit in Management Science (joint with M. Pollrich)[link]
• Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values, reject and resubmit in Games and Economic Behavior (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
• Information design in sequential procurement (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
• Sequential procurement with limited commitment (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
• Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions (joint with H. Mass)[link]
• Contract design with limited commitment (joint with A. Wambach)[link]

Work in Progress

• Social norms and market behavior – Evidence from a large population sample (joint with T. Riem, N. Fugger, P. Gillen, P. Werner)
• Auctions vs. negotiations: Evidence from procurement professionals (joint with N. Fugger, P. Gillen, G. Kokott, T. Riem)
• You know me (joint with N. Fugger, M. Praxmarer)

Book Chapters

• Sustainable Procurement, in CSR and Business Models, (2017) Springer (joint with F. Haas)
• Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design (edt. M. Bichler and J. Goerree), (2017) (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach)

Further Publications

• Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (joint with T. Klein and A. Wambach)
• Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016 (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)

In the Media

• Méthode d'attribution des fréquences 5G: de choix discutables, Les Echos (joint with O. Bos)
• Allemagne: ces encheres 5G qui n'en finissent plus..., Les Echos
• En Allemagne, la 5G a déjà rapporté plus de 5 milliards, Les Echos
• Bieterschlacht der Telkoriesen, Handelsblatt
• Was wurde eigentlich aus der 5G Auktion, Bild Zeitung
• Nochmal gut ausgegangen, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Wambach)
• Die Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen, Tagesspiegel
• Finale im Milliardenspiel, Süddeutsche Zeitung
• Mobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig, Süddeutsche Zeitung (joint with A. Wambach)
• Die Mär von der Totalen Transparenz, Wirtschaftswoche
• Plötzlich nützlich, Der Volkswirt, Wirtschaftswoche
• Von der Analyse zum Design der Märkte, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (joint with A.Wambach)
• Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Sanches)

Policy Reports

• Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience [link]
• Marktdesign für den öffentlichen Hochbau - Machbarkeitsstudie