Vitali Gretschko

ZEW and University of Mannheim

Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement, accepted in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (joint with H. Mass, N. Fugger and A. Wambach) [link]
A procurement mechanism to assign refugee quotas, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (2018) [link]
Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German 2015 LTE auction, Telecommunication Policy, (2017) (joint with M. Bichler and M. Janssen)[link]
Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?, Economic Theory Bulletin, (2017) (joint with P. Gillen and A. Rasch)[link]
Procurement under public scrutiny: Auctions vs. negotiations, RAND Journal of Economics, (2016) (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
Excess information acquisition in auctions, Experimental Economics, (2015) (joint with A. Rajko)[link]
Information acquisition during a descending auction, Economic Theory, (2014) (joint with A. Wambach) [link]
On the strictly descending multi-unit auction, Journal of Mathematical Economics, (2014) (joint with A. Rasch and A. Wambach)[link]

Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement, revise and resubmit in Management Science (joint with M. Pollrich)[link]
Worst-case subjective-belief equilibria in first-price auctions, reject and resubmit in Theoretical Economics (joint with H. Mass) [link]
Contract (re-) negotiation with private and common values, reject and resubmit in Games and Economic Behavior (joint with A. Wambach)[link]
Information design in sequential procurement (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
Sequential procurement with limited commitment (joint with N. Fugger, M. Pollrich)[link]
Contract design with limited commitment (joint with A. Wambach)[link]

Social norms and market behavior – Evidence from a large population sample (joint with T. Riem, N. Fugger, P. Gillen, P. Werner)
Auctions vs. negotiations: Evidence from procurement professionals (joint with N. Fugger, P. Gillen, G. Kokott, T. Riem)
You know me (joint with N. Fugger, M. Praxmarer)

Sustainable Procurement, in CSR and Business Models, (2017) Springer (joint with F. Haas)
Bidding complexities in Combinatorial Clock Auctions, in Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design (edt. M. Bichler and J. Goerree), (2017) (joint with S. Knapek and A. Wambach)

Die Regeln machen den Unterschied: Marktdesign, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (joint with T. Klein and A. Wambach)
Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer: Beschaffungskonflikte in der Automobilindustrie, Wirtschaftsdienst, 09/2016 (joint with N. Fugger and P. Gillen)

Méthode d'attribution des fréquences 5G: de choix discutables, Les Echos (joint with O. Bos)
Allemagne: ces encheres 5G qui n'en finissent plus..., Les Echos
En Allemagne, la 5G a déjà rapporté plus de 5 milliards, Les Echos
Bieterschlacht der Telkoriesen, Handelsblatt
Was wurde eigentlich aus der 5G Auktion, Bild Zeitung
Nochmal gut ausgegangen, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Wambach)
Die Lizenz zum Schnellsurfen, Tagesspiegel
Finale im Milliardenspiel, Süddeutsche Zeitung
Mobiles Internet für alle, aber richtig, Süddeutsche Zeitung (joint with A. Wambach)
Die Mär von der Totalen Transparenz, Wirtschaftswoche
Plötzlich nützlich, Der Volkswirt, Wirtschaftswoche
Von der Analyse zum Design der Märkte, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (joint with A.Wambach)
Warum totale Transparenz auch kontraproduktiv sein kann, Wirtschaftswoche (joint with A. Sanches)

Spectrum Aggregation Limits in Auctions with Spectrum below 1 GHz: the European Experience [link]
Marktdesign für den öffentlichen Hochbau - Machbarkeitsstudie