"Die Praxis sollte das Ergebnis des Nachdenkens sein, nicht umgekehrt." (Hermann Hesse)

(Practice should be the result of contemplation, not vice versa)


Working Papers and Advanced Work in Progress:

[13.] Persuasion, Motivated Reasoning, and the Political Economy of Climate Change Inaction [April 2024, slides for 20min presentation of earlier version]

Abstract: Two office-motivated politicians compete in an election by proposing policies. There are two possible states of the world: climate change is mild, and thus has no lasting effect on welfare, if the appropriate policy is taken, or climate change is severe, and hence decreases welfare, even if appropriate measures are taken. A well-informed lobby group attempts to persuade voters that climate change is only mild. Voters may choose to hold motivated beliefs, thus diverging from Bayesian reasoning. If the lobby's reach is limited, then the election always provides efficient incentives and politicians campaign with the policy platforms they believe to be welfare-maximizing. However, if the lobby's reach increases, for example, because digital social media platforms facilitate wider sharing of disinformation, this changes. In particular, if severe climate change would have catastrophic consequences, then there is only an inefficient equilibrium: politicians ignore any information and always offer policies targeting mild climate change. The reason is that the lobby's actions, together with voters' innate desire to ignore bad news, imply that voters would punish any policy targeting severe climate change on election day. If severe climate change is not catastrophic, however, there are multiple equilibria: the described inefficient one, and a second, efficient equilibrium, in which politicians' incentives are aligned with those of the electorate, and in each state the welfare-maximizing policy is most likely to be implemented. Interestingly, the likelihood that the optimal policy is implemented increases, when voters find it easier to distort their beliefs, because motivated reasoning now limits the lobby's influence.



[12.] Troll Farms (with Boris Ginzburg) [April 2024, draft, slides]

Abstract: Political agents often attempt to influence collective choices through troll farms—organizations that flood social media platforms with messages emulating genuine information. We model the behavior of a troll farm that faces a heterogeneous electorate of partially informed voters and aims to achieve a desired political outcome by targeting each type of voter with a specific distribution of messages. We show that such tactics are more effective when voters are otherwise well-informed. Consequently, societies with high-quality media are more vulnerable to electoral manipulation, and counteracting troll farms may require the promotion of informative but nonexpert opinions. At the same time, increased polarization, as well as deviations from Bayesian rationality, can reduce the negative effect of troll farms and restore the efficiency of electoral outcomes. 


[11.] Information Sharing with Social Image Concerns, with Dana Sisak [March 2024, draft, slides]

Abstract: We investigate how social image concerns influence the patterns of information sharing among peers. In our study, a sender receives a signal ("news") and has the choice to share it with a peer ("receiver") or not. This signal comprises two attributes: a headline (e.g., advocating for or against human-induced climate change) and a veracity status (either "proper," meaning the headline is based on facts, or "fake," meaning it contains no information about the underlying state). The headline is observable to everyone at no cost, while the veracity status can be observed by talented senders and receivers at a certain cost.  We analyze the sharing patterns driven by two distinct social image concerns: the desire to be perceived as able (demonstrating the ability to recognize accurate information) and the desire to signal one's worldview (expressing a personal belief). Our model provides an explanation for the empirical finding that fake news is spread more frequently than legitimate news on digital social networks (e.g., Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). We demonstrate that both a concern for veracity and a concern for worldview can generate such a sharing pattern. Furthermore, we offer additional predictions on how to empirically differentiate between these two motives.


[10.] Backfiring Climate Protests [coming soon]

Abstract: A climate activist group aims to induce a policy change by imposing costs on citizens as long as the policy change has not occurred. Citizens need to make a decision: whether to support the activists' cause or oppose it. If the fraction of citizens supporting the cause surpasses a threshold value, the government will take action and implement the desired policy with a probability of z, which represents the government's responsiveness. With the remaining probability of 1-z, or if the number of citizens supporting the activists' cause remains below the threshold value, the game moves to the next round, and the status quo policy remains unchanged. When government responsiveness is high, imposing a strictly positive cost on citizens increases the chances of achieving the intended policy change by the activist group. However, if government responsiveness is low, imposing costs on citizens leads to opposition against the activists' cause, and climate protests backfire. The model can explain why activist groups such as Fridays for Future have increased popular support for measures against climate change, while others like Extinction Rebellion or The Last Generation seem to decrease it.



[9.] Feedback Effects or Small Sample-Size Theater? Regression to the Mean in a Real-Effort Tournament, with Simona Demel, Jonas Radl, and Jan Stuhler [coming soon, old slides]


Publications:

[8.] Showing off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs (with John Morgan and Dana Sisak). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, Volume 14, pages 529–580. Latest draft here.

[7.] Social Connectivity, Media Bias, and Correlation Neglect (with Martin Dumav and Boris Ginzburg). The Economic Journal, 2021, Volume 131, pages 2033–2057. Latest draft here. Slides here.

[6.] Valence, Complementarities, and Political Polarization. Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, Volume 128, pages 39-57. Latest draft here.

[5.] Campaign Contests (formerly 'A Theory of Communication in Political Campaigns'). European Economic Review, 2020, Volume 127, article 103459. Latest draft here.

[4.] Hide or show? Endogenous Observability of Private Precautions against Crime (with Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe). American Law and Economics Review, 2019, Volume 21, Issue 1, pages 209–245. Latest draft here.

[3.] Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments? (with Dana Sisak). Economics Letters, 2016, Volume 149, pages 94-97. Latest draft here.

[2.] Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition? (with Dana Sisak). Journal of Public Economics, 2015, Volume 130, pages 1-14 (lead article). Latest draft here.

[1.] The Fragility of Deterrence in Conflicts (with Dana Sisak). Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2015, Volume 27 (1), pages 43-57. Latest draft here.


Work in Progress (titles are tentative):






Older Papers/Projects: