Hercules Airworthiness Review Team (HEART)

The HEART report of 1997 repeats the findings of the 1992 Chinook/Wessex/Puma, 1996 Puma and 1997 Tornado reports. (In turn, later confirmed by the 1998 Nimrod ART). That is, the RAF Director of Flight Safety again delivers dire warnings of systemic failures to the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and the RAF Chief Engineer; who completely ignored him.

In 'Breaking the Military Covenant', I reproduced a paper I wrote discussing what HEART called 'the principal airworthiness hazard to the routine operation of the aircraft', the Cloud and Collision Warning Radar. It is further irrefutable evidence that Haddon-Cave was wrong to claim the systemic failings commenced in 1998, clearly showing the trigger was a June 1987 policy issued by Air Member Supply and Organisation (RAF). Supporting evidence is cited including internal MoD audit reports, dated 1988 and 1996 (all provided to Haddon-Cave and, later, Lord Philip).

The complete HEART report is attached. On 8 November 2011 MoD denied its existence, only providing it upon appeal. This has been a common occurrence when seeking to obtain these reports under Freedom of Information.

7.2 Hercules Airworthiness Review Team Report 30.9.97.pdf