MENGQI ZHANG

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Colorado Boulder. My research interests are in Microeconomic Theory with a focus on information and mechanism designs, as well as the managerial and policy implications in Marketing and Industrial Organization.

My current research agenda encompasses the following topics:

Persuading Receivers with heterogenous prior beliefs warrants screening mechanisms. My Job Market Paper on this topic addresses the over-persuasion issue in public persuasion and discusses signal-contingent mechanisms as a solution.

Consumers are willing to pay a premium for conspicuous information designed by the seller. However, they may be uncertain about what conspicuous information will be revealed to the public in the equilibrium. My Job Market Paper on this topic shows how conspicuous consumption is affected in this scenario, where the price not only designs the conspicuous information but also serves as a signal that influences the consumer's perception of this information.

I am on the job market for the 2023-24 academic year. Please find my CV here. I am available for interviews. Kindly contact me at mengqi.zhang@colorado.edu.