Deepal Basak

Research

Topic: Panic

A panic is an event in which a crisis occurs not because of weak fundamentals but because of strategic uncertainty (for instance, a bank run, or sovereign debt default). In such problems, the players do not necessarily move simultaneously, and this can be an effective tool for persuasion. We study this problem from a dynamic adversarial information design perspective and find practical policies to reduce such panics. 

• Panics and Early Warnings (with Zhen Zhou),  R&R JPE (major revision)

How does a timely alert about the impending disaster eliminate panic?

• Diffusing Coordination Risk (with Zhen Zhou), AER

How do asynchronous moves help in coordination? 

• Stress Tests: Frequency vs Strength (with Mayur Choudhary and Zhen Zhou) 

Can more tests substitute for tougher tests in dissuading agents from running on a bank? 

Topic: Bargaining

In representative democracies, public sentiment plays a crucial role in negotiations because negotiations may not happen behind closed doors. We study various information environments regarding public sentiment, their welfare impact, and the value of information.   

• Aspiration and Bargaining (with Urmee Khan),  NEW Paper

Why do leaders lowball expectations, and does it hurt their constituents?  

• Gambling over Public Opinion (with Joyee Deb),  AER

Why do political parties wait and see which way the public opinion moves before coming to an agreement, and how does it affect welfare? 

• Social Value of Public Information in Bargaining,  EJ

Does more information about a player improve social welfare in bargaining?

• Bargaining under Almost Complete Information, JET

Does a small probability of being uninformed make a large difference in bargaining?

Topic: Information Similarity

The world is more interconnected today, which makes information more similar. We propose an order of information similarity and show how it affects incentives in strategic environments.

• Similarity of Information and coordination (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar)

How does information similarity affect the set of equilibrium in coordination games?  

• #Change (with Joyee Deb and Aditya Kuvalekar), NEW Paper

When does similar information help people to mobilize for a shared cause to bring social change?

Topic: Misc

• Does Financial Tranquility Call for Stringent Regulation? (with Yunhui Zhao), 

Financial Tranquility encourages investors to take more risk. Does this call for higher taxes?

• Alliance, Acquisition, and Excludability (with Krishnamurthy Subramanian), 

When the assets are non-excludable, which ownership structure is more efficient - alliance or acquisition?